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Abstract: A growing priority for firms and governments is the protection of trade 
secrets against theft. Trade secrets, often stored and protected in digital formats, 
represent key intangible assets for firms and strategic assets for economies. Recent 
years has seen the expansion of trade secrets protection in both US and EU law, as 
governments seek to adapt policy to the changing and expanding threat of cybercrime. 
Here, we build on US FBI policy to model the interaction between a firm and a 
government protection agency.  We consider the decision by the firm to adopt high or 
low security measures to protect their trade secrets, the decision to report an incident 
of theft, and the government protection agency’s assignment of low or high priority to 
the case. We find that whether security breaches are made public or not can be the 
margin that determines whether firms will invest in high security. Our findings 
suggest that adjusting reporting requirements could be a policy measure to help 
address the growing threat of trade secret theft.  
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I. Introduction 
Headline figures suggest that the theft of trade secrets2 costs the world’s economies 
between one and three per cent of GDP annually3.  Due to their secret nature, the 
veracity of these estimates is difficult to confirm, but the overall picture is clear – 
firms and governments view trade secrets as important assets, and their theft poses an 
economic threat.  
 
Prior to the digital era, trade secret theft involved thriller-worthy plots such as using 
airplanes to photograph competitor’s factories. These days, the theft of trade secrets is 
facilitated by the predominance of the storing of trade secrets in digital files, and the 
reliance on cybersecurity for their protection. In the context of cybercrime, criminals 
may target, often unseen, the crown jewels of a firm’s intellectual assets. Despite the 
economic impact of trade secrets and their theft, the relative paucity of data has lead 
to neglect by the research community (Arundel 2001, Almeling 2012, Morikawa 
2014).  We seek to address this gap in the literature. 
 
This paper develops an economic model that details the interplay between firms, their 
choice of security measures, and the government security agencies tasked with 
protecting trade secrets and prosecuting their theft. The next section provides a 
summary of the relevant policy background, followed by a literature review; we then 
proceed to develop and analyze our model and its firm behavior and policy 
implications; our final section concludes and points to future areas of research.  
II. Policy background: EU and US 
The protection of commercial, intangible assets, known as trade secrets, against cyber 
espionage is a top priority for governments worldwide. In line with these priorities, 
the EU approved the Trade Secrets Directive in April 2016, which expands trade 
secrets protection. The 2015 draft of the EU Trade Secret Directive states the 
intention to improve legal protection of trade secrets to, “…enhance the 
competitiveness of European businesses and research bodies, which is based on trade 
secrets, and also improve the conditions/framework for the development and 
exploitation of innovation and for knowledge transfer … to improve the EU’s 
competitiveness in the global knowledge economy.”4  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A trade secret must meet the following criteria: 1) it must be secret, 2) it must have commercial value 
because of its secrecy and 3) it must be subject to reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy.2  It differs 
from other forms of Intellectual Property (IP) protection, particularly patents, in that it does not require 
disclosure (being made public), does not expire and does not require registration. The relatively low 
threshold is balanced by its relatively low protection, as trade secrecy protection can be lost through 
independent discovery, reverse engineering, misappropriation2, and theft. This paper focuses on the 
theft of trade secrets, it also covers the theft of trade secrets to benefit a foreign entity, which is 
commonly known as economic espionage. 
3 Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade, and PWC (2014) “Economic Impact of Trade Secret 
Theft,” available at: http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/economic-impact.html. 
This estimate is calculated for the world’s top 40 economies. The authors note the limitations of 
estimates of trade secret valuations, and use a combination of R&D spending and white collar crime as 
proxies for the annual theft of trade secrets.  
4 EU (2015) “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, 
use and disclosure,” Document 17392/13 + ADD 1 PI 18 CODEC 2842 
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Accompanying European policy debates is the expansion of trade secrecy protection 
in the United States. In May 2016, The Defend Trade Secrets Act was enacted, its 
summary states that “trade secret theft harms owner companies and their employees.”  
This expansionist tendency of recent US and EU trade secrets policy may have 
unintended consequences. For example, expanded protection could aggravate 
censorship and transparency issues highlighted by trade secrets researchers (Turilli 
and Floridi 2009, Pasquale 2011, Levine 2014). Such a protectionist direction will 
also impact whistleblowing (Lindblom 2007, Khoury 2014) and limit employee 
mobility (Reder and O’Brien 2012, Png and Samilia 2013, Selmi 2014).  Employee 
mobility, which should allow for the diffusion of innovation, also interacts with 
innovation policy; Png (2012) demonstrates the positive economic impact, notably in 
Silicon Valley, of Californian laws preventing employers from using trade secrets to 
limit their employees’ ability to work for competitors. Thus, improved understanding 
of the interplay between key actors in trade secrets should provide insights into the 
theft of trade secrets and help optimize trade secrets policy. 
FBI and the ‘Fight’ Against Theft 
Modern policy has adopted a decidedly bellicose tone in protecting the economic role 
of trade secrets, with the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) particularly 
noted as having adopted a war narrative (Rowe, 2016) in treating the theft of trade 
secrets as a threat to national security. Dreyfuss and Lobel (2016) likewise note a 
strong US rhetoric where economic espionage is now treated as military espionage, 
and US firms as potential allies.  This accompanies the increasing politicization of 
cybersecurity and complex interactions between actors (Basuchoudhary and Choucri, 
2014.) In the US, FBI investigation of trade secret theft is done as part of a 
counterintelligence and white-collar crime remit. However, the policies put in place 
instead suggest that, in the face of limited resources, the FBI’s policy preference is to 
encourage awareness higher protection of trade secrets by firms; this suggests a 
strategy of prevention, rather than prosecution, of theft. The Obama Administration’s 
2013 Strategy on Mitigation the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets notes five strategic 
actions: 
1. Focus Diplomatic Efforts to Protect Trade Secrets Overseas  
2. Promote Voluntary Best Practices by Private Industry to Protect Trade Secrets  
3. Enhance Domestic Law Enforcement Operations  
4. Improve Domestic Legislation 
5. Public Awareness and Stakeholder Outreach  
The FBI further suggests the prioritization of the prosecution of well-protected, high-
value trade secrets, as the reporting checklist5 requires significant details on the value 
and protection measures. This paper will build on these preferences and policies, to 
develop a model of the interaction between government security agencies and firms. 
III. Literature Review The	  trade	  secrets	  and	  cybercrime	  literatures	  have	  largely	  developed	  independently.	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  detail	  the	  relevant	  literature	  and	  tie	  together	  the	  two	  strands.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “Checklist for Reporting an Economic Espionage or Theft of Trade Secrets Offense” FBI (2017). 
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Trade Secrets as a means of appropriation 
In both the US and EU policy debates, the emphasis is on the economic impact of 
trade secrets and the immediate need for their protection. Existing economics 
literature largely focuses on trade secrets as a means to provide a legal structure for 
innovators to appropriate the returns to their innovation. This literature falls under the 
economics of Industrial Organization and Innovation, with a strong emphasis on 
Intellectual Property aspects of trade secrets.  
 
A key theme in the literature is to examine the firm’s decision to use trade secrets. A 
core model is Anton and Yao (2004), which finds that, particularly when property 
rights are weak, firms use trade secrets to protect their ‘big’ innovations, and patents 
to protect ‘little’ innovations as disclosure outweighs the benefits of the relative 
strength of patents. Other authors also use models to investigate the decision between 
trade secrets and patents (Bhattacharya and Guriev, 2006; Bulut and Moschoni, 2006; 
Ottoz and Cugno, 2006, 2008; Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka, 2007; Mosel, 2011; Kwon, 
2012; Panagopoulos and Park, 2015); or disclosure versus secrecy (Mukherjee and 
Stern, 2008). Generally, the literature frames the costs of protection of trade secrecy 
as a cheaper alternative to the costs of patenting. An exception is Henry and Ruiz-
Aliseda (2016), who examine the dynamics between holders of a trade secret, the 
level of protection, competitors and efforts to “break” the trade secret through reverse 
engineering.  The authors consider the cost of a protection (which could include 
cybersecurity) as an entry cost into trade secret ownership and note that this can serve 
as a barrier to entry.  
 
Limited empirical evidence also suggests that trade secrets are a preferred measure of 
protection for innovations (Cohen et al 2000, Arundel 2001, Anton & Yao 2004, Png 
2012, 2015; Crass et al, 2016). Hall et al (2014), provide a literature review of the 
empirical and theoretical literature on the subject. The literature has largely 
emphasized the role of trade secrets as a means of appropriation and competitive 
advantage.  
 
Theft 
While trade secrets as a means of appropriation are vulnerable to reverse engineering, 
the increasing policy and industry interest is on theft as a vulnerability. Largely 
committed in the cyberworld, the theft of trade secrets differs from more general 
interpretations of theft. Unlike tangible property, the theft6 or misappropriation of IP, 
which is intangible, does not deprive the owner of the property. This nuance leads 
some scholars to challenge treating IP theft as a crime (Moore 2007).  However, 
unlike other types of intellectual property, such as patents and copyright, the 
misappropriation of a trade secret undermines its very definition – it negates its 
secrecy. Thus, the owner is not deprived of the use of the trade secret, but of its 
secrecy and associated value.  Similar dynamics in value and protection apply, to 
varying degrees, to other cybersecurity breaches classified by Gordon et al (2011) as 
breaches of: confidentiality (confidential information), availability (e.g. denial of 
service), and integrity (e.g. website defacements.)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Theft or misappropriation is contrary to criminal or contract law and therefore illegal. This is distinct 
from independent discovery or reverse engineering, which are legal. 
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The empirical legal literature has begun to address the impact of theft of trade secrets. 
Carr and Gorman (2001) find that the announcement of the theft of trade secrets 
negatively impacts the stock market price of the trade secret owner, which is evidence 
of an incentive not to report; Cavusoglu et al (2004) have similar findings. Argento 
(2012) provides a legal analysis of the decision to report a theft. In particular, the 
author delves into reasons a firm may not report or pursue a trade secret theft. These 
are: failure to detect the misappropriation, inability to identify the perpetrator, 
embarrassment, concern about disclosing the trade secret, business diplomacy, and 
convenience. In particular, Argento notes, “a CSI/FBI survey found that 48 percent of 
respondents cited negative publicity as a reason for not reporting a computer security 
breach to law enforcement.” [emphasis added] This approach is at odds with FBI 
efforts to improve the protection of trade secrets through criminal law; if trade secrets 
owners do not use existing tools, then the deterrent effect of the law is weakened.  
Cybersecurity  
In recent years, economists’ interest in analysis of firm, hacker and government 
agency decision has increased. This literature falls under the realm of privacy 
breaches, software vulnerabilities and general hacks. Here we focus on those most 
relevant to our model. Png et al (2006) develop a theoretical model in which they note 
that an increase in enforcement (i.e. the government agency increasing its prosecution 
of hackers), could lead to a decrease in firm’s protection measures and hence an 
increase in demand for enforcement. They describe the potential unsustainability of 
this approach and note instead, under certain conditions, and in keeping with the 
FBI’s strategy, that promoting user protection measures is an efficient strategy.  
Gordon et al (2015b) acknowledge that limited empirical evidence exists to evaluate 
the effectiveness of existing policy encouraging firms to invest in their cybersecurity, 
but that government support for training and awareness may allow firms to better 
allocate their cybersecurity budget.  
 
Further policy-related analysis can be found in Arora et al (2008); the authors 
examine factors affect the timing of the disclosure (report) of software vulnerability 
and the policy measures to optimize this. They argue that both immediate disclosure 
and secrecy (no disclosure) are suboptimal, firms generally report too late and that 
policy makers should encourage a relatively short period between discovery and 
disclosure. Romanosky et al (2011) find empirical evidence suggesting that policies 
requiring firm disclosure of data breaches have reduced the impact of breach-related 
crime. We discuss similar policy measures in our findings. 
 
The cybersecurity literature generally includes IP theft but does not focus on it 
specifically. A notable exception is Andrijcic and Horowitz (2006), who develop a 
macroeconomic model to estimate the impact of cyber security risks on IP. The 
authors note that IP theft can have longer-term, insidious impacts on firms compared 
to short-lived cyber attacks such as denial of service. This suggests that IP theft 
represents an important strategic concern, in keeping with the policy concerns 
described in the introduction. 
 
At the firm level, cyber attacks and theft pose a threat to performance.  While the Carr 
and Gorman (2001) paper finds a negative stock market performance impact 
following the announcement of a trade secrets theft, and Andrijicic and Horowitz 
(2006) note that IP theft can have longer-lasting impacts, the impact of other types of 
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security breaches is inconsistent and may be surprisingly short-term or negligible. An 
empirical study by Aquisiti et al (2006) find that the negative stock market impact of 
data breaches (private customer data) is statistically significant but short-lived, but 
note that the indirect damage to trust and goodwill, and higher insurance premiums in 
the future may harm firm performance. Similarly, Davis et al (2009) find evidence 
that cyber security incidents such as data breaches do not impact web traffic for 
online businesses, and, as a result, they argue it is difficult for policy makers to 
encourage investment in cybersecurity. Hilary et al (2016), examining data breaches, 
argue, “the market reaction to cyber-breaches is statistically significant but 
economically limited.”7 More recent papers suggest that the impact may be changing. 
Gordon et al (2011) finds a significant, negative impact on stock market prices 
(particularly when the breach is affects availability), but that the impact appears to be 
deccreasing as investors lower the expected costs of such breaches. A recent paper by 
Arcuri et al (2017) suggests that the literature on the topic has mixed findings over the 
previous 20 years, and their research finds in favor of a negative, significant stock 
market reaction to announcements of information security breaches.  
Collective security 
A common theme in the literature is the argument that cybersecurity is a collective 
good with significant positive externalities and that, much like immunizations, 
investment in cybersecurity encourages ‘herd immunity.’ However, the economics of 
effecting the collective benefits are less straightforward with incentives often being 
suboptimal and numerous market failures, particularly given the need to focus on 
collaboration at the system, rather than individual, level (Andersen and Moore, 2006).  
 
A number of authors examine coordination problems and make suggestions for policy 
solutions. Gordon et al (2015a) note private underinvestment by private actors is the 
default outcome as positive externalities are not included in decision-making, and 
argue in favour of government regulation to increase cyber security investment.   
Basuchoudhary and Choucri (2014) argue that, depending on the strength of 
international governance systems, cybersecurity can be akin to a stag hunt game, or, 
the authors note, a prisoners’ dilemma where cooperation is costly. They argue that 
culture of computer users, in combination with the strength of governance systems, 
influences the optimal policy design.  No clear solution has emerged. 
Beckerian implications 
There is an obvious overlap between the modelling of trade secrets theft and the 
Beckerian cost-based approached to crime. Adopting the basic Beckerian model, the 
theft of trade secrets has important implications on private prevention costs and loss, 
public expenditures on crime fighting and social loss. Becker (1968) details the 
industry of crime, of which cyber security expenditures, FBI investigations and the 
benefits to criminals of crime all play a part. He argues that social loss is a function of 
damages, costs of apprehension & conviction, the social cost of punishment and the 
number of offenses. Becker models fines as potentially social welfare increasing as 
they function as a form of transfer pricing, whereas incarceration, which is measured 
as a unit of time, can be more effective as a punishment as it can be a heavier resource 
burden on the criminal.8 Empirically, there are challenges to calculating the relevant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hiliary et al (CITE), p. 4. 
8 The optimality conditions vary. Becker notes that the ‘harm’ caused by fines or incarceration should 
outweigh the gains to the criminal. Yet, in some cases, defendants with limited financial resources may 
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Beckerian utility and loss functions. The level of cybercrime is unknown, as crime is 
not always detected, and the value of the trade secrets is notoriously hard to predict.  
 
The question for the theft of trade secrets is the optimal levels of private and public 
investment in detection and prevention of theft (cybersecurity), and the optimal level 
of investment in deterrence via the expected punishment (detection and punishment 
levels.) As Hua and Bapna (2003) describe, investment in cybersecurity reduces the 
losses to firms and note that that the literature generally focuses on the classic 
deterrence model in cybersecurity.  
 
Our model focuses on two categories in the 1968 Beckerian model of crime, with the 
aim of providing insight into optimal public policy. The areas of our focus are: 
apprehension & conviction (public expenditures) and protection & apprehension 
(private expenditures.) We take as given the remaining three elements: damages, 
supplies of offenses and punishments. Additionally, we focus on the interplay 
between public policy objectives and firm behaviour, rather than total social loss to 
society. As outlined in the discussion on FBI strategy, one goal of current public 
policy is to reduce the social loss by encouraging private investment in protection 
(cybersecurity). The general expectation is that this is efficient both in terms of 
reducing the supply of offenses and damages, and, potentially, a more efficient 
balance of public versus private expenditures.  
 
We assume that theft is given, and that the supply of offenses, damages and 
punishment are independent of the model. Within the two categories of interest, we 
examine private and public expenditures. Becker notes that cost (C) to apprehend & 
convict criminals is a function of activity (A), which is police and judicial activity. A 
itself is a function of manpower (m), resources (r) and capital (c).  The FBI must 
gauge the correct Cpublic in order to achieve an efficient outcome. However, as Becker 
notes, echoed in Png et al (2006), private expenditures, by the individual in our case 
Cfirm, are negatively related to both Cpublic and Cprivate (the set of expenditures by other 
firms.) This is a problem in the face of the ‘herd immunity’ achieved by collective 
expenditure on cybersecurity. This misalignment between the incentives of the 
individual firm, total C and the overall social loss again supports the rationale behind 
the FBI’s efforts to encourage private investment, although its ultimate efficacy 
remains to be seen.  
IV. The Model 
We model a signaling game with two players. The sender is a firm. This firm can be 
of two types. Type HS has a high security cyber environment. Type LS has a low 
security cyber environment. Nature chooses the type; the likelihood of a high security 
firm is P(HS) = α.  Either type of firm can report an exogenous breach -- like stealing 
of a trade secret -- of their cybersecurity environment. They may also choose to not 
report a breach. This report signal is received by some government security agency. 
This agency has does not know whether the report is coming from a HS or LS type 
firm. However, the agency does have to decide whether to place a high or low priority 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unable to pay (“judgment proof”) and incarceration may be the only feasible punishment. Becker notes 
that the value of prison time will vary between defendants, and thus the ‘fairness’ of the punishment 
also varies.  
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on the report, in the interest of maintaining an efficient level of Cpublic. The agency has 
a Bayesian belief about the likelihood of receiving a report from a high security firm. 
This Bayesian belief drives the agency’s likelihood of placing a high priority on 
following up on a report.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Signaling Game 
The players have preference ordering over actions. We model preference orderings 
under two conditions – when a security breach goes public and when it does not. 
Moreover, we assume that reporting a breach always makes the breach public. 
However, we model two circumstances if the firm does not report the breach. In one 
case the breach goes public whether the firm reports it or not. In another the breach 
only goes public if the firm reports it and not if it does not.  In all these cases, we 
assume that the hacker is found and convicted automatically if the security agency 
places a high priority on a report and the firm is HS9. The payoff preference orderings 
for the two players are as follows. 
 
The security agency’s payoffs in order of preference are A > B > E > F > D > C. 
Thus, for example, the agency prefers to place high priority on reports from a high 
security firms rather than a high priority on a low security firm (A > C). In fact, it 
would prefer not receiving any report at all over receiving reports from a low security 
firm, as prosecutions in the face of low security are unsuccessful10 (F and E are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In Beckerian terms, the probability of conviction p = 1 if HS, HP, 0<p<1 if HS, LP and p = 0 if LS. 
10 In order to qualify for trade secret protection, the knowledge in question must be subject to 
reasonable steps of protection; low security is assumed not to have met, ex post, this threshold. Anson 
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preferred over C and D). Nevertheless, it would rather not receive a report from a low 
security firm than a high security firm (E > F). In any case the agency would rather 
place a high priority rather than a low priority on reports it believes are coming from 
high security firms (A > B) and vice versa if it believes reports are coming from low 
security firms (D > C). The security agency does not care whether a security breach 
goes public or not. 
 
If a security breach goes public irrespective of whether a firm reports it or not the 
payoff preference ordering is G > H > I > J > L > K. Thus, a high security firm having 
done due diligence on security would rather have the security agency place a high 
priority on their report than a low priority and in any case, would rather report than 
not report (G > H > L) since in any case there is no advantage from hiding the breach. 
In fact, the low security firm would also prefer reporting to not reporting in order to 
avoid bad publicity and the liability cost of not reporting given the assumption that 
the breach is bound to go public (I and J are both > K). We further assume that L > K 
because even if the breach goes public the high security firm can at least claim to 
have tried to deter criminals by securing their network and therefore avoid the sort of 
liability faced by low security firms that did not even try to do the right thing.  
 
On the other hand, if the security breach does not go public then the payoff preference 
ordering is G > L > H > K > I > J. First of all, the lack of publicity changes the low 
security firm’s payoffs and skews it toward not reporting at all since the liability from 
going public no longer exists. Nevertheless, if the low security firm did report it 
would prefer that the security agency place a high priority on the report. This is moot 
though since the low security firm will never report under the circumstances. The 
high security firm though is faced with a conundrum. If it reports the breach to the 
security agency then, as always, it prefers a high priority by the security agency. The 
security agency’s use of high priority will result in conviction of the perpetrators IF 
HS, minimise the ability of competitors to use the innovation protected by the trade 
secret and may result in criminal damages11 paid to the firm. However, the firm would 
rather not report if it believes that the report will receive a low priority from the 
security agency. Recall reporting leads to public revelation of the breach. A low 
priority by the security agency then would not only not result in a conviction but it 
would reveal that the breach happened and tarnish the firm’s reputation. 
V. Model Analysis and Results 
As noted above our model has two cases – one where a security breach goes public 
irrespective of whether a firm reports it to the security agency or not and another 
where the breach is only made public if the firm reports the breach. We analyze each 
case below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Suchy (2005) note that trade secrecy protection is often only determined when conflict has arisen 
(similar arguments exist for patents, in which the validity and scope of a patent may only be defined 
through litigation.) 
11 To note that damages here mean damage payments. Under Becker’s (1968) model, damage payments 
mean that most punishments can produce a gain for the victim. Here, we question that assumption as 
the negative impact on the firm’s reputation (in a repeated game) may outweigh any financial gain 
from transfer payments (damage payments.)  
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Case 1. The security breach goes public. In this case, the high security firm prefers G 
and H over L. The low security firm also prefers I and J over K. Both types of firm’s 
then will always report to the security agency. The security agency knows that in this 
pooling scenario it is likely to get a report from a HS firm with α probability. Thus, it 
gets a report from a low security firm with probability 1 - α. The security agency then 
calculates its expected payoffs from placing a high priority and compares it to its 
expected payoffs from placing a high priority. It then chooses the strategy with the 
higher expected payoff. The expected payoffs are: 
 
E(HP) = αA + (1 - α)D        (1) 
and 
E(LP) = αB + (1 - α)D        (2). 
Thus, the security agency will only place a high priority on a report iff (1) > (2) i.e. if 𝛼 >    𝐷 − 𝐶 𝐷 − 𝐶 + 𝐴 − 𝐵        (3). 
Notice that (3) is certainly plausible since it requires that α be greater than some 
positive fraction.12 Thus, our result suggests that the security agency will place a high 
priority on a report only if the likelihood of a HS type firm is high and will place a 
low priority on any report otherwise. From a policy perspective then the fact that all 
breaches go public does counterintuitively create a space where the security agency is 
unlikely to place a high priority on any report! One possible dynamic effect of such a 
situation could disincentivize firms from choosing high security in the first place and 
further depressing α.13 This could create a vicious cycle where firms do not choose 
high security at all – after all why bother if the security agency is unlikely to pay 
attention and do something about it. Under these circumstances the only possible 
stable option may be to force the security agency to always give high priority to a 
breach or hack as a matter of enforceable law. Given that security agencies routinely 
prioritize law enforcement this seems unlikely. Another possible policy response may 
be to force firms to reveal their type on pain of punishment given the incentive 
structure where all security breaches ultimately go public. The FBI reporting checklist 
requires significant disclosure on protection measures, which may be an indication 
that some form of triage already exists. 
 
Case 2. The security breach does not go public if unreported. In this case notice that 
the firm’s payoff structure suggests that the LS type firm will never report a security 
breach. The HS type firm though will report a security breach if it believes that the 
report will be accorded a high priority but not otherwise. This creates a scenario 
where both types of firm’s may not pool (always report) on reporting a breach. This 
opens the possibility of a mixed strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. However, the 
truth is simpler. In this case, the fact that the LS firm will never report a breach means 
that all reports MUST be from the HS firm even if some HS firms choose not to 
report. Thus, from the security agency’s perspective the likelihood that a reported 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 (3) is always a positive fraction since the denominator will always be larger than the numerator and 
positive given the rank ordering of the payoffs. 
13 We do not model this endogeneity here but it seems like a plausible inference. 
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breach is from a HS type is 1. Given this belief is optimal for the security agency to 
always place a high priority on any reported breach. Of course, in that case the HS 
type firm should always report. In other words, when not reporting a breach never 
becomes public, then the HS firm always reports, the LS firm never reports, and the 
security agency always places a high priority on a reported breach. This, of course is 
ideal from the security agency’s perspective. In fact, though we do not model α 
endogenously in this paper, over time this scenario may encourage firms to choose 
high security. 
 
Policy implications 
The key objective of the US government, as demonstrated by FBI policy, is to reduce 
the level and impact of trade secret theft. In the face of limited resources and 
relatively unlimited demands, it is FBI policy to encourage improved security at the 
firm level. As we have noted, existing FBI policy is generally soft encouragement 
through awareness and training measures. However, as our model has shown, the 
threat of a theft going public may be sufficient incentive for a firm to choose HS. At 
HS, the firm is in a good position even if they are in Case 2, as they still report. For 
firms who have chosen LS, the threat of going public is a sufficient disincentive that it 
provides a policy lever for the FBI. A number of solutions present themselves to 
encourage disclosure: theft reporting requirements, financial reporting requirements 
and data breach reporting requirements. However, it may ultimately be that the role of 
encouraging investment in cybersecurity inadvertently falls to the courts.  
 
In theft reporting, the FBI could adopt a harder measure in requiring the disclosure, 
such as a mandatory reporting law. In this scenario, a victim firm would be required 
to report the theft of the trade secret – providing a strong incentive, based on the 
potential costs of bad publicity, to have prevented the theft in the first place through 
HS. Currently, under the US Law Failure to Report a Crime under Federal Law (18 
U.S.C. section 4, also known as misprision of a felony), only active concealment, 
rather than failure to report, is against the law (e.g. only following direct question 
during a federal investigation would the firm (employees) be required to report.) 
However, the introduction of broader requirement to report would have to be 
delicately worded with a very narrow scope so as not to discourage the use of trade 
secrets in the first place, in addition to unintended consequences such as implications 
on whistle-blowers and journalists. Such a solution may also present civil liberty 
concerns. 
 
Building on existing financial reporting regulations, such as the reporting 
requirements of listed companies, could also encourage good practice by firms. 
Currently the annual 10-K form includes a section on speculation and risk, where 
cybersecurity breaches can be reported. Hilary et al (2016) find that the use of this 
section has increased modestly 14  over the period 2010-2015. Additionally, 
cybersecurity levels, measured by spend and incidents, could become part of standard 
reporting requirements. Likewise, where firms have chosen to include valuations of IP 
on their balance sheets, the loss of secrecy through theft would also imply the need to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The authors find that the proportion of firms using this section increased by 11% in their sample of 
147 firms that had suffered a data breach, and by 17% in the control group. 
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adjust the balance sheet accordingly. Insurers may also play a role in this, as trade 
secrets can be insured and policies likely require reporting when secrecy is impacted.  
 
Further possibilities existing under data protection laws. The protection of personal 
data, which could ostensibly be covered by trade secrecy, may be covered by existing 
privacy protection laws. In the event of a cybersecurity breach resulting in the theft of 
such data, firms would be obligated to disclose the theft. Similar disclosure policies in 
data breaches are estimated to reduce identity theft by 6% (Romanosky et al, 2008) 
and increase investment in cybersecurity (Hoofnagle, 2007). Yet Hilary et al (2016), 
find that US policies to encourage disclosure have lead to only a modest increase in 
disclosures. However, disclosure requirements may provide an additional incentive to 
invest in cybersecurity, in an attempt to avoid bad publicity, yet could result in over-
reporting and negatively impact FBI resources.  Additionally, such regulations will 
increase costs to businesses. 
 
A related option, and one that is likely the most probable in the foreseeable future, is 
that the courts will refine what counts as “reasonable protection” in order to qualify 
for trade secrecy. This is akin to decisions in other areas of IP, such as setting the 
level of inventiveness in patents or the delineation of infringement in copyright – both 
of which are established policy levers. If the bar is set higher than current levels of 
protection, then firms will be incentivized to invest in cybersecurity in order to protect 
their trade secrets.  This could achieve the FBI’s goal to encourage investment and 
reduce theft, without the concerns about reporting and potential strains on FBI 
resource. However, this approach could go both ways – courts may either raise or 
lower the security bar, as decisions are based on individual cases. The court need not 
consider the wider ‘herd-immunization’ implications, which could result in the bar 
being set below the socially efficient level.  
 
Finally, Becker’s analysis becomes relevant again here. While we have focused on the 
FBI’s desires to reduce theft via increased private investment cybersecurity (Cprivate), 
Becker also notes that the expected utility of crime (EU), which is a function of the 
probability of prosecution (p), punishment (f), and the income from the crime (Y) also 
influence the supply of crime. While Cprivate increases p by increasing the probability 
of detection, it is beyond direct FBI control. However, the FBI could choose direct 
action to reduce EU by increasing p through increasing Cpublic or increasing f through 
legislation (in conjunction with government.)  These classic Beckerian policy options 
merit further exploration and reflect the increased criminalization of trade secret theft.   
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we model a scenario where a cybersecurity breach could affect firms 
who may have high security or low security. Security agencies in their turn may not 
know if a firm is a high or a low security firm. They would like to prioritize reports 
from high security firms and convict hackers. We find that when unreported breaches 
inevitably become public the security agency might (if α is low enough) choose to 
never place a high priority on any report. This sort of scenario may generate a vicious 
cycle where more and more firms choose to go with low security given that the 
security agency does not investigate cyber-attacks because it believes that reports are 
more likely to come from low security firms. This effect is eliminated if not reporting 
a security breach guarantees the privacy of the firm. In this case, the low security firm 
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never reports a security breach while the high security firm always reports a breach 
and the security agency places a high priority on all reports because it believes them 
to be from high security firms. This separating equilibrium may then jumpstart a 
virtuous selection process encouraging more firms to adopt high security. Thus, 
publicity may paradoxically enhance the likelihood of adverse selection and worsen 
the security environment in cyber space.  
 
Our model presents a number of extensions and possibilities for future research. In 
particular, we have assumed that the firm knows ex ante whether their theft will go 
public. Removal of this assumption could change the outcomes significantly, as the 
negative publicity from not reporting a theft could shift the firm’s preferences. 
Additionally, incorporation of the policy measures we have suggested could 
manipulate outcomes in favor of FBI preferences. We have necessarily focused on a 
single-firm case, however a more macro approach could provide insights into welfare 
impacts, firm interactions and international implications. There is also some room for 
empirical exploration of our theory; differences between jurisdictional approaches to 
data breaches and trade secret theft may provide room for natural experiments to test 
our policy conclusions. As cybercrime and trade secrets continue to be a growing 
concern for firms and governments, we expect to see increased research interest in 
this area.  
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